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[L. A. No. 19660. In Bank. Jan. 16, 1948.]

UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, Appellant, .,..
UNION SUGAR COMPANY (a Corporation), Respon-:
dent.
[1] Evidence-Extrinsic Evidence-In Aid of Interpretation-Burrounding Oircumstances. - Where a supplemental contract
amending an oil and gas lease is uncertain on its face with'
respect to a clause providing that after a designated intermission the lessee would be obligated to drill a certain number
of wells each year, evidence of the negotiations of the partiea
and of the surrounding circumstances is admissible for the
purpose of determining the meaning of the lease as modified b)"
such clause. (Code Civ. Proc., I§ 1856, 1860.)
[2] OU-Leases-ActioDll-Evidence.-In an action for declaratoryrelief with respect to a supplemental contract amending an oil
and gas lease, the evidence did not support a finding that the
drilling obligations of the lease were not modified by the sup'
plemental contract, where it appeared from letters exchanged,
between plaintiff's assignor and defendant that the partiea,
agreed that the lessee would be obligated to drill a certain num-,
[l]See ., OaLJur. 294; 20 Am.Jur. 9~
McK. Die. BeferenC8S: [1] Evidence, § 41l; [2, 3] Oil, 137(1);,
[4] Appeal and Error, 11172; [6] Oil, § 24.

/
/

/

Jan. 19481

UNION OIL CO.

tI. UNION SUGAR
131 C.2d300: 188 P.2d .70]

Co.

301

ber of wells each year regardless of the price of oil, that this
obligation was in lieu of the drilling requirements of the original lease, and that the lessee agreed to pay advance royalties
and to increase his drilling operations in regara to offset wells.
[Sa. Sb] Id.-Leases-Actions - Evidence. - In an action for declaratory relief with respect to a supplemental contract amending an oil and gas lease, where an inference that the parties did
pot intend to create a new contract could only be drawn if the
letters between them showing an intent to relieve the lessee of
the original obligation were disregarded, and where the trial
court specifically found that such letters were mailed and received, the evidence was not reasonably susceptible of an inference in defendant's favor that would support the conclusion
that the original lease was not modified by the supplemental
contract.
_/ . \ ;
[4] Appeal-PresUJDptions-Findings.-The rule thtain the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law ery intendment is in favor of the judgment appealed from, d that it is
presumed that every fact or inference essentiai"to the support
of the judgment and warranted by the evidence was found by
the court, is inapplicable where the court made specific findings
which were inconsistent with inferences in support of the judgment.
[6] OU-Leases--Oonstruction.-In an action for declaratory relief with respect to a supplemental contract amending an oil
and gas lease, the rule that in cases of uncertainty the language of a contract should be interpreted most strongly against
the party .who caullCd the uncertainty to exist and that the
promisor is presumed to be such party (Civ. Code, § 1654),
could not support a judgment for defendant lessor, where a
basic issue in the case was who was the promisor, and where,
moreover, the evidence showed that the modification was suggested by the president of defendant company in language that
was copied almost verbatim into the formal document.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa
Barbara County. Ernest D. Wagner, Judge. Reversed.
Action for declaratory relief with respect to a supplemental
contract amending an oil and gas lease. Judgment for defendant reversed.
L. A. Gibbons, Jerry H. Powell, Douglas C. Gregg, Brobeck,
Phleger & Harrison, MaUl1ce E. Harrison and Moses Lasky
for Appellant.
Cross & Brandt and Arthur H: Brandt for RespondenL
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TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff brought this action for Qe~IIara."
tory relief to obtain a determination of its drilling oblligllti(lul
under an oil and gas lease as modified by a sUI>pllem4mtlll IlIlUee-JI
ment between the parties. Plaintiff appeals
entered in favor of defendant, Union Sugar UOlnplmy
The original leaSe was executed in 1936 between U""''''',..a..u1oi1tl
Union Sugar Company, as lessor, and Sovereign Oil Cnll"1Vl.1'a.;~
tion, as lessee. E. H. Moore, Incorporated, a one-man corporation, hereinafter referred to as Moore, succeeded to the
rights of the lessee. Subsequently, plaintiff acquired the lease
from Moore. The original lease gave the Jessee the right
extract oil and gas from a tract of land containing aplPl'O,Xl·'j
mately 6,700 acres for 20 years and for as long 1,1J~'r.,.1..I.
hydrocarbon substances were produced from the land.
,
lessee agreed to pay the lessor a royalty of one-eighth of tli.e
proceeds from the sale of the oil and gas. Paragraph 7 of
the lease provided that after the discovery of oil and gas in'
paying quantities, the lessee would continue to drill additional
wells until it had drilled one well for each 10 acres held under .
the lease. It also specified the rate of drilling required of the
lessee:
"After the discovery of oil or gas in paying quantities on
the demised premises, Lessee agrees to continuously operate ..
one string of tools with due diligence for the first year after
such discovery, two strings of tools for the second year after
such discovery, three strings of tools for the third year after
such discovery, four strings of tools for the fourth year after
such discovery, and five strings of tools thereafter until the .
drilling requirements herein specified are complied with.
Lessee may defer the commencement of the next well to be I
commenced with each string of tools to be operated hereunder :'
for a period of not to exceed thr~e months after the comple- ',
tion of the well next preceding the well drilled with that
particular string of tools. The lessee shall be entitled to drill
as many additional wells on said land and premises 88 it
desires."
The original lease contains three clauses suspending the
drilling requirements of paragraph 7. Paragraph 7, in addition to its other provisions, provides:
"Drilling and producing operations hereunder may also
be suspended while the value of oil of the quality produced
from said land, as defined in paragraph One hereof is Sixty
Cents or less per barrel at the well, :.r when there is no available market for the same at the well at such price."
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Pllragraph 10 of the lease contains a force majeure clause
providing that the drilling requirements shall be suspended
whenever the lessee is prevented from complying with the
Jease because of strikes, lockouts, actions of the elements, accidents, rules and regulations of any federal, state, municipal
or other governmental agency, or because of other matters or
conditions beyond the lessee's control.
Paragraph 33 provides that the lessee may suspend drilling
operations if it is obligated to curtail production by reason of
any valid order, rule, law or regulation of any federal, state
or other governmental subdivision and such curtailment makes
it impossible for the lessee to produce oil at a profit.
Two other provisions of the original lease are pertinent.
Paragraph 9 of the original lease provides that the lessee
agrees to drill offset wells whenever a well on adjoining property within 250 feet of the limits of the land contained within
the lease is producing oil or gas in paying quantities. Paragraph 25 of the original lease provides that the lessee may
surrender all or any part of the acreage and thus reduce the
number of wells to drill.
Soon after the lease was executed, the Pacific Coast Railway Company, which owned a strip of land extending across
part of the leased premises, became a party to the lease. This
company was named as a defendant in the present action, but
permitted its default to be entered and is not a party to this
appeal.
In September, 1939, the price of oil produced at the wells
on the leased premises dropped below 60 cents a barrel, and
Moore, who was then the lessee, suspended drilling operations
in accord with the provisions of paragraph 7. By this time,
the lessee had spent over a million dollars in drilling 12 wells,
two of which were dry, three wholly unprofitable, and the
rest of moderate production. In October, the price of oil of
the quality produced by these wells was from 45 to 46 cents a
barrel at the wells. In that month Moore and the Union Sugar
Company commenced negotiations for a modification of the
lease. In 1940, the defendant Union Sugar Company entered
into a formal agreement with Moore. The agreement was entitled "Supplemental Contract" and was executed as of
February 1, 1940, by defendant, Pacific Coast Railway Corporation, and Moore. By the terms of this agreement the parties
agreed that the original lease "be and the same is hereby.
modified in the foilowing respectS~ to wit:

i1
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"(1) All obligations to drill additional wells, except
wells, are hereby suspended for a period of two years
February 1, 1940.
"(2) At the expiration of said two year period,
shall be obligated to complete three wells per year.
"(3) Numerical paragrapb (9) of the lease of April
1936, [with respect to off-set wells] shall be modified by
ing out 4250 feet' wherever the same appears therein, and
serting in lieu thereof' 330 feet.'
44 (4) Commencing from the date of this supplemental
tract, Moore agrees to pay a minimum royalty of ;P""".VVV.VVl
per year, payable monthly in advance, and said royalty
be charged against the total oil reserves during the course
the life of the lease; that is to say, Moore shall be entitled
all oil and/or gas produced from said lease, or the proceed.l
thereof, until it is fully reimbursed from lessors' one-eighth
~:
royalty interest for the minimum royalty so paid.
" (5) Except insofar as the provisions of the lease of April
8, 1936, are in conflict herewith, the same shall remain in full
force and effect. "
In 1940, plaintiff acquired the rights of Moore as lessee. On
June 22, 1942, defendant served on plaintiff a notice of defanl~
reciting that plaintiff was not operating two strings of tools I
on the leased property and was therefore not complying witi(
the terms and conditions of paragraph 7 of the original lease, :
since the price of oil was then over 60 cents a barrel. The notice,
also recited that if this failure continued for 90 days after the·i·
date of the notice, the lease would terminate and the lessee'.,l
rights to drill additional wells would be forfeited. A contro-,
versy having arisen concerning the extent to which the sup-'
plemental contract modified the drilling obligations of paragraph, 7 of the original lease, this action was brought. Plaintiff alleged that clause 2 of the "Supplemental Contract"
modified paragraph 7 so that the lessee after February 1, 1942
is only obligated to drill three wells a year regardless of the
price of oil.
When the ease first came on for trial the court sustained
defendant's objection to the introduction of any extrinsic evidence with reference to the negotiations and circumstances surrounding the execution of the supplemental agreement. The
complaint was amended, and when the ease came on for trial
the second time defendant's objection to the introduction of
this evidence was overruled and the evidence was admitted.
The trial court, however, found that the drilling obligations of
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paragraph 7 were not modified by the •• Supplemental Contract
so as to obligate plaintiff only to complete three wells each
year in lieu of the continuous operation of any specified number of strings of tools. I t Accordingly, the trial court concluded
that the plaintiff, after February 1, 1942, and during the remainder of the terms of said lease, is bound by the drilling
requirements of paragraph 7 of the original lease, and construed the modification clause as binding the plaintiff, "after
February 1, 1942 . . . to complete in any event at least three
wells each year on the premises described in said lease."
(Italics added.)
This requirement, however, was held subject to the provisions of paragraph 10 of the original lease and "plaintiff is
not required to perform the same if and while plaintiff is prevented from complying therewith in whole or in part by reasons of strikes, lockouts, action of the elements, accidents, rules
and regulations of any Federal, State, Municipal or other governmental agency or other matters or conditions beyond the
control of the plaintiff."
From a judgment for defendant entered in accord with this
conclusion, the plaintiff appeals, on the ground that the trial
court erroneously construed the "Supplemental Contract" as
not modifying the drilling requirements of paragraph 7 of the
original lease. [1] The:first question presented by this appeal is whether the trial court acted properly in admitting
evidence of negotiations between the parties as an aid to the
interpretation of the supplemental contract. Both parties contend that apart from these negotiations the contract is susceptible of only one interpretation. They disagree, however,
as to what that interpretation should be. Defendant contends
that the trial court's interpretation must be sustained because
the supplemental contract on its face provides that" All obligations to drill additional wells . . . are hereby suspended for
a period of two years from February 1, 1940. . .. At the expiration of said two year period, Moore shall be obligated to
complete [in any event at least] three wells per year." Plaintiff contends that the provision in question is clear on its face
and reasonably susceptible of only one construction, namely
.. At the expiration of said two year period, Moore shall be
obligated to complete [only] three wells per year. I t The basis
of plaintiff's contention is that since the provision contains the
word «. obligated," it was intended to measure the obligation of
the lessee and thus replaces the. drilling requirements of para&raph 7 of the original lease. An examination of both the lease
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and the "Supplemental Contract" makes it clear that they'
cannot be construed together without reading words into,
clause 2 of the latter i n s t r u m e n t . ; ,
Once something has to be read into a contract to make it'
clear, it can hardly be said to be susceptible of only one inter-:
pretation. It would have been error for the trial court to read.
something into the contract by straining "to find a clear mean~
ing in an ambiguous document, and having done so exclude the
extrinsic evidence on the ground that as so construed no am~:
biguity exists." (Body-StefJlIer Co. v. Flotill Products, 63
Cal.App.2d 555, 562 [147 P.2d 84].) Moreover, the Construction advanced by the defendant would not support the decision
of the trial court. Merely reading the words "in any event"
into the clause in question was not sufficient to clarify the
meaning of the lease as modified, for the trial court held that·
plaintiff was not obligated to drill wells in any event. Para-'
graph 7 was not the only provision of the original lease providing for a suspension of drilling requirements. The trial;
court held that plaintiff's obligation to drill was subject to
suspension in the event of strikes, accidents and other condi-.
tions specified in the provisions of paragraph 10 of the original
lease but such obligation to drill would not be suspended by
reason of the conditions specified in paragraph 33. This construction, if based only on the express wording of clause 2 of
the "Supplemental Contract," would be unreasonable, for it
would require the court to read the clause as if it provided that I
"Moore shall be obligated to drill three wells per year [under .
all circumstances except those provided in paragraph 10 of the
original lease but not including the provisions of paragraphs :
7 and 33 thereof]."
\
It is thus apparent that the contract is not clear on its face,
and under the theory of the parol evidence rule that has been
accepted by the majority of this court, l evidence of the negotia-l
tions of the parties and of surrounding circumstances was
admissible for the purpose of determining the meaning of the

I

'The view hal been expressed that the requirement of ambiguity
involved in the admission of extrinsic evidence "simply means that
the language used by the parties must be susceptible to the meaning
claimed to have been intended by the parties." (Dissenting opinion in
E.tate of ]lUle, 25 Cal.2d 1, 22 [152 P.2d 1003, 155 A.L.R. 1319).) Under
this theory, extrinsic evidence is generally admissible to show the sense
iB which the parties used language embodied in the contract, whether or
IIOt the words appear ambiguous to the reader. (See concurring opinion
iB U"wer.al Sales Corp. v. California etc. Mfg. Co., 20 Ca1.2d 751, 776
[128 P.2d 665); Rest. Contracts, § 242, comment a; Holmes, The Theo",
III Legall"ter1Wetatio~ 12 Ba.rv.L.Bev. 417, 420; Wigmore on E1Jiduu:e.

i
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lease as modified by clause 2 of the" Supplemental Contract."
(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1856, 1860; Universal Sales Corp. v. California etc. Mfg. Co., 20 Ca1.2d 751, 761 {128 P.2d 665] ; Wachs
v. Wachs, 11 Ca1.2d 322, 326 [79P.2d 1085] ; Balfour v. Fresno
Canal & Irrigation Co., 109 Cal. 221, 223 [41 P. 876] ; Weinstein v. Moers, 207 Cal. 534, 540 [279 P. 444] ; McNeny v.
7'ouchstone, 7 Cal.2d 429, 433 [60 P.2d 986] ; Body-Steffner
Co. v. Flotill Products, supra, 63 Cal.App.2d 555, 561; McDaine, California Evidence Manual, §§ 408,409.)
This conclusion does not run counter to the provision of the
"Supplemental Contract" that "Except insofar as the provisions of the lease of April 8, 1936, are in conflict herewith, the
same shall remain in full force and effect." It is clear that
before this general provision can be applied, the meaning of
the specific provisions of the agreement must first be ascertained in order to determine the extent to which they conflict
with the original lease.
[2] The question remains whether the trial court's conclusion as to the meaning of clause 2 of the supplemental contract can be affirmed on the basis of the extrinsic evidence.
This evidence consisted of various letters between the representatives of the parties to the modification agreement and
testimony with reference to a conference, during the course of
negotiations, between Moore's representative and the president and two directors of defendant corporation. The evidence
with reference to the letters is not in conflict. The trial court
made specific findings as to what occurred at the conference
and found that the letters were properly mailed and received.
In October, 1939, Mr. Villard Martin, Moore's attorney, entered into negotiations with Mr. T. A. Twitchell, attorney for
defendant, for the purpose of modifying the original lease.
The evidence regarding these negotiations and the tentative
plan agreed upon by the two representatives is contained in
a letter written on October 14, 1939, by Mr. Twitchell addressed
to Mr. Edmunds Lyman, then president of defendant corporation, for the purpose of having Mr. Lyman submit the proposed plan to defendant's board of directors. The letter stated
that "Mr. Moore desires to construct a topping plant to handle
the oil from the lease, but does not desire to spend the money
required to build this plant if he has to comply with the exist(3d ed.) U 2458-2478; MeBaine, The RuZe .Against DiBturb'ng Plain
Meaning of Writing8, 31 Cal.L.Rev. 145.) In view of the fact that the
instrument involved in this ease is not free from ambiguity, it is unneee~sary to consider the applieability of this intel'prctation of the extrinsic
evidence rule. (See Bodll-Steff'~r Co. v. Flofill Produc1s, supra at 562.)

"

/

)

)

808

UNION OIL Co.

t1.

UNION SUGAR Co.

[31 C.

ing drilling requirements of the lease." The plan tentativelj.
agreed upon by the two attorneys is outlined in the letter ..
follows:
.
!.
cc 1. The Union Sugar Company shall agree to suspend all
drilling obligations for a period of two years, except the obli'
gation to drill offset wells. At first glance, this may appear to
be too much of a concession, but on the other hand, at the.
present price of oil, Moore is not obligated to drill. Based
upon my conversations with operators in the field, I do noi.
believe that the price of this grade of oil is going above 60_'
per barrel within the next two years. Of course, ~o one can'.
foresee the future market conditions, and if oil should go tC:,
60¢ or more per barrel, the Company would lose the royalty"l
on the allowable production from the wells which Moorewoulcr
be required to drill if the lease was not modified. To offset·.
this, the Company would begin to receive royalty from the
lease immediately if the lease is modified and Moore constructS:
a topping plant.
':
"2. The existing proven area, comprising some 400 acr~'
would be zoned and in that zone, after two years, Moore would
be required to drill 3 wells per year, provided that the priCe.
of oil is 60, or more per barrel at the well, excepting when the '
following circumstances existed: •.• [at this point the letter.
contains further limitations on the requirement of drilling
three wells a year which are not material to the ease since they
are not covered in the contract.]
., The provision ealling for three wells per year was inserted
because three wells per year would be all that Moore would be
required to drill, assuming that he was operating with one
string of tools. Martin said he might desire to drill three wells :
all at one time under contract rather than to allow 90 days to '
elapse between wells, as provided in the lease.
"3. Moore should not be obligated to drill any addition81
wells on any part of the leased property outside of the proven \'
area, unless oil should be discovered in the property or adja.
eent property at such locations that it would appear probable;
dlat oil could be discovered and produced from a portion of
die unproven area."
"\
. This plan was rejected by defendant's board of directors. ,
fte negotiations leading to it are important, however, for:
tIIey indicate that at that time Moore was interested in build· '
iDg a refinery; that he wished to be relieved of drilling obligations for two years; and that thereafter he was to drill only
tine wells per year when the price of oil was over 60 cents.
I

/
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The letter is also relevant to show the connection between the
requirement of paragraph 7 of the original lease that the
lessee operate a certain number of strings of tools and the requirement of clause 2 that the lessee drill three wells since one
string of tools will ordinarily drill one well a month. In view
of the 90-day interval between the completion of one well and
the beginning of another provided for in the original lease,
one string of tools would apparently drill about three wells
each year.
After entering into the foregoing negotiations with Mr.
Twitchell, Moore's attorney returned to Tulsa, Oklahoma. The
trial court found that, "in December 1939 [Mr. Martin] again
went to California; that upon his return to California he had a
conference with Roland E. Tognazzini, Francis L. Cross and
Fred Cooke respecting a possible modification of said Original
Lease; that said Roland E. Tognazzini was then President and
said Francis L. Cross and said Fred Cooke were then directors
of the defendant UNION SUGAR CoMPANY; That during said
conference said Villard Martin stated to said Roland E. Tognazzini that said E. H. MOORE, bro. considered the drilling
requirementS' of said lease of April 8, 1936, as prohibitive and
desired some relief therefrom and that said E. H. MOORE, INO.
desired to have said drilling requirements modified so as to
provide for a complete suspension of drilling operations for
two years.
"That it is true that said Roland E. Tognazzini stated to
Villard Martin that defendant UNION SUGAR COMPANY 'had a
situation where the Company beeauseof a posted price of oil
being less than 60¢ which was the figure in this particular
lease stood not to receive revenue for a great many years to
come' and that if said E. H. MOORE, IN"o. desired relief upon
the drilling requirements of said Lease it would be necessary
for them to pay an adequate consideration for it.
C C That it is true that said Villard :Martin returned to Tulsa,
Oklahoma, and on January 11, 1940 wrote and sent to said
Roland E. Tognazzini and said Roland E. Tognazzini in due
course received the letter dated January 11, 1940.•.. " This
letter repeated substantially the plan that had been submitted
to defendant in Twitchell's letter of October 14, 1939.2 By
"With reipect to the modification of drilling requirements of the leue
Mr. Martin '. letter of January 11, 1940, eontained the follOwing proPOW:
, •All obligation to drill additional wells, except ofraet wella, are hereb:r
tuspended for a period of two years from the date of this contract.
c, At the expiration of said two :reaz period, 1I00re Ihall be obliaated to

)
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a letter dated January 16, 1940, and addressed to M
defendant's president, Tognazzini, again rejected this p',
posal and made a counteroirer. This letter reads as folloWa
"In response to yours of the 11th, may I first advise
the terms and conditions contained therein are unsatisfacto
"It was my impression from past conversations you
with my predecessor, and more recently, with Messrs. Coo
Cross, and me that it was the desire of E. H. Moore, Inc. .
obtain a modification of the present oil and gas lease e . ..
between E. H. Moore, Inc., and the Union Sugar Company
In this connection, I expressed to you at our recept meetiDI
that Union Sugar Company was desirous of cooperating wi ,
E. H. Moore, Inc., but only to the extent that both pam "
were to benefit mutually by said modification.
"I gathered definitely that the main desire for a modifi
tion on your part was to .liminate what lIOU consider aft·
onerous drillmg clawe. 1ft '1Ms connection 1 stated that we,
would be willing to modify ,aid drillmg clause after due and
proper consideration wer" gitlm 'herefor.
I t As 1 see the problem, it reHlfHI itself dcntm to a tier';,
simple one, to-wit: your autr.
lie released of the pres",'
drilling clause and
pe""'tlM dn1l after a two year 1tU~1
p",sion of all dn1.ling requirement" three wells per year. W,}
on the other hand, desire to obtaift a minimum royalty throug~,
ottt the duration of the 'ease. In view of the fact that
present lease ties up some 6,700 acres and further, in view'
of the fact that E. H. Moore, Inc., has arbitrarily determined
that 400 acres are proven, in spite of the fact that it is the.
consensus of opinion that considerably more acreage is oil
bearing, it necessarily follows that to determine a minimum
royalty based upon the unit plan as you have indicated in:
yours of the 11th, cannot logically follow.
'

)

.6

's'0

the:

------------------------------------------------,

c1ril1 three wells per year in any area consisting of approximate];' 400
acres, being that part of the leased prelDises which is considered proven
territory and identi1ied by a plat attached hereto as Exhibit A, provided
that the priee of oil is smy cents per barrel, or more, at the well, exeept
that Moore shall not be obligated to drill during the existence of either
.1 the following conditions:
,
I I <a> If Moore is unable to market oil to be produeed from II8icl
pr'!F:,rty;
.
, <b) If operators in the teld are unable to market 100 barrels, or
more, ~ clay from wells capable of producing 1500 barrels, or more, per
day, and Moore would be uDable to market 100 barrels, or more, per cla;y
from any well to be drilled by it on said property;
"(e) If Moore is unable to market any oil in addition to the quantity
fIf oil produeed from wella already drilled by Moore while said wella are
WDg operated in compliance with good oil teld pr~ee."

)
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"Both you and I, in obtaining a modification, desire to
reduce it to its simplest form and to this extent I suggest the
following, to-wit:
"(1) the suspension of aU obligation to drill additional
wells, except offset wells, for a period of two years from date
of the modification,
.
"(2) the modifying of the paragraph 9, by striking out
250 feet and inserting in lieu thereof 330 feet, and in addition thereto, appropriate language to provide that when offset
wens are being produced within said range, more or lesa,
E. H. Moore, Inc. likewise produce,
"(3) at the expiration of the two year period, E.H. Moore,
Inc. shall be obligated to driU three wells per year.
"The consideration for the above will be the paying of a
minimum royalty of $25,000 per year, said royalty payable
monthly in advance." (Italics added.)
It is notable that the wording of clause (1) of this proposal
is almost identicaJ with paragraph (I) of the modification
agreement and that there is no substantial difference between
the wording of clause 3 of the proposal and par-agraph (2) of
the agreement. (See McNeny v. Touchstone, 7 (:la1.2d 429,
435 [60 P.2d 986].)
)
The proposal contained in the foreg~t'tir was eventua]]y accepted by Moore but not without further negotiations.
Moore replied to Tognazzini's letter on January 25, 1940,
stating that clauses (1) and (2) were acceptable but that
"there should be some conditions attached [to clause (3)] that
would provide for an exemption from drilling obligations
under certain possible market conditions and the price of
oil." Moore also stated that the consideration asked by Tognazzini was not satisfactory, and Moore offered to pay $1,000
a month minimum advance royalty beginning February 1,
1940.
.
In a letter dated January 27,1940, Tognazzini rejected this
counteroffer and again offered the terms contained in his
letter of January 16, 1940. He stated in his January 27th
letter:
"It has been the policy of this company to cooperate to the
fullest with its lessees, whomsoever, and it shan continue that
policy in the future. In this particular case you have asked
for concessions which in the final analysis operate exclusively
unilaterally in your behalf.
"Because of your past financial performance on our property and the anticipated future performaneea in the aame

t
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connection, we have been willing to entertain such a ULl.UGI.eCII
arrangement solely because of our desire to be cooperative..
entertaining BUch a modification, we have asked only
nominal sum of $25,000 per year, payable monthly in aa1t1a,~.
Said consideration is really not a consideration,. but
payment, monthly in advance, of a minimum royalty
presently known oil reserves; said royalty to be ehlllrQ'j""'J
against the total oil reserves during the course of the life
the lease. So in effect any modification of this lease
.
strictly to your added and new benefit and wit1t.out any
ienefit to us.
"You infer that the modification might commence
February 1st. In this connection may I advise that the mo:nthl1J
meeting of the Board of Directors is to be held W.,........~,'.AGJ
January 31st at 1 :30 p. m. If you desire that I obtain
the Board at such meeting a ratification of the proposed
fication, as contained in mine of January 16th, please -_.,._.•
me on or before said date. If that be your desire, it wt"U be II
rimple matter to draw up a modification as heretofore ouf~
"ned, the language pertaining thereto to be satisfactory
both parties." (Italics added.)
".
This offer was accepted by Moore in a letter dated Janlll&t'Y
29, 1940. Moore wrote:
"Replying to your favor of the 27th inst., 1 beg to advise that 1 have decided to accept your proposition and pay
you an advance royalty equalling $25,000.00 per year, payable monthly in advance, beginning with the month of February. 1 am therefore enclosing herewith check for $2,083.33
being the first monthly payment on the proposed modification
that you will submit to your Board of Directors on the 31st.'~
The letter continued with reference to matters not pertinent to this case. Moore concluded the letter as follows:
"I will request Mr. Martin to prepare a modification of
the lease embodying the principles contained in our correspondence, and forward it to you within the next day or I
two. 1 would do it at this writing, but Mr. Martin is occu- I
pied DOW in the trial of a lawsuit that may cause a little
delay, but if your Board authorized the modification, I think
that is all that will be required."
Mr. Tognazzini acknowledged the check and reported that
the proposal had been accepted by the board of directors of
respondent in a letter dated February 1st, 1940, with the
following language:

I,
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"In reply to yours of January 29th, I am pleased to advise that at the meeting of the Board of Directors yesterday
afternoon the proposed modification of Oil Lease by and between Union Sugar Company and E. H. Moore, Inc., as contained in my letter to you of the 16th and accepted by you
in yours of January 29th, was ratified.
"I am sure that Mr. Martin and I will be able to embody
the principles agreed upon, to the satisfaction of all parties,
and I shall do nothing further in this connection until I hear
from Mr. Martin." _~
The trial court foUnd that "thereafter and as of the date
of February I, 1940" defendant UNION SUGAR COHPANY and
the said E. H. MooRE~'iN'm.~tered into a written agreement
entitled 'Supplemental Contract'. . . ." The Pacific Coast
Railway Corporation signed the "Supplemental Contract,"
thus making it a binding modification of the original lease.
Considering the correspondence quoted above and the specific findings of the trial court with reference to the negotiations, the conclusion is inescapable that, except for the
provision in regard to o~set wells, the parties intended to
~lieve the lessee of the obligation to drill more than three
wells a year after the expiration of the two-year period of
suspension of drilling. These letters and findings show that
the lessee wanted a two-year suspension of all drilling because he was contemplating the building of a refinery and
that the defendant was willing to agree to this suspension
because there was little likelihood that the lessee would be
obligated under the lease to drill during that period in any
event. The lessee also desired a modification of the drilling
requirements of clause 7, subject to limitations, based on
market conditions and the price of oil. On the other hand,
the lessor wanted an assurance of annual income from the
lease and insisted that Moore, after the end of the two-year
sUspension, be required to drill three wells a year regardless
of market conditions and the price of oil. The parties 1inal1y
agreed to terms suggested by defendant's president, which
were proposed as a concession to the lessee without any substantial benefit to the lessor except. for the advance royalties. Given the explanation of these terms by defendant'.
president, it is clear that the parties agreed that the lessee
would be obligated to drill three wells a year regardless of
the price of oil or other market conditions, and that this
obligation was in lieu of the drilling requirements of para-
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graph 7 of the original lease. In consideration for this co~~
cession, the lessee agreed to pay advance royalties and :t;.
increase his drilling obligations in regard to offset wells. ..\
The trial court nevertheless concluded not only that th8
parties did not intend to grant any concession to the lessee
other than the two-year suspension, which the lessor's presi..;
dent had virtually admitted to be an unnecessary provision,
but that the lessee had agreed to assume drilling obligations
in addition to those under paragraph 7 of the original lease"
to pay advance royalties, and to increase his o\>ligations with
respect to offset wells.
It is contended that the trial court erroneously interprete
the contract without regard to the extrinsic evidence. Th
trial court found "That it is untrue that the claims of defendant UNION SUGAR COMPANY have created an ambiguity
or that any ambiguity is apparent upon the face of said Original Lease as modified by said Supplemental Contract." U
this "finding" was intended as a finding that extrinsic evidence was inadmissible, it is of course an erroneous conclusion of law. (Brant v. California Dairies, Inc., 4 Ca~.2d 128,',
133 [48 P.2d 13]; Wachs v. Wachs, 11 Cal.2d 322, 325 [79
P.2d 1085].) The trial court, however, admitted evidence
with reference to the negotiations between the parties and
made extensive findings thereon. It must therefore be assumed that the finding merely means that the trial court
concluded that the contract, considered with reference to the
evidence of these negotiations, was none the less susceptible
of only one interpretation, namely the interpretation relied
on by defendant. (Eastman Oil etc. Corp. v. Lane-Wells Co.,
21 Cal.2d 872, 875 [136 P.2d 564].) The question remains,
therefore, whether there was any evidence from which a reasonable inference could be drawn to support this conclusion.
(Eastman Oil Corp. v. Lane-WeUB Co., supra; Estate of Platt,
21 Cal.2d 343, 352 [131 P.2d 825] ; Estate of Rule, 25 Cal.
2d 1, 10 [152 P.2d 1003, 155 A.L.R. 1319].)
Defendant contends that the evidence with reference to
the conference in San Francisco between Martin, as Moore's
representative, and three directors of defendant corporation
is in confiict and that a reasonable inference can be drawn
from the evidence in defendant's favor, supporting the conclusion that the contract means that the drilling requirements
of paragraph 7 of the original lease were not modified by thE'
supplemental agreement.
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Tognazzini testified that when Martin came to California
after the submission of the plan outlined in the Twitchell
letter of October 14th, 1939, the witness informed him that
the proposal had been rejected by defendant's board of directors. The witness also testified that he stated at the conference
that because of the price of oil, defendant, under the original
lease, stood not to receive revenue for a great many years
to come; that defendant was willing to agree to a two-year
suspension of all drilling requirements; that "they were under no obligation to drill anyway;" but that thereafter there
should be a requirement that the lessee drill three wells a
year when the price of oil was below 60 cents, as well as some
provision for advance royalties. Tognazzini testified further
that "Clause 7 [of the original lease] as such, or any other
numerical paragraph was never mentioned" and that nothing
was said at the conference as to what the drilling requirements would be after the two-year suspension whenever the
price of oil should be above 60 cents; but on cross-examina- '----.
tion, the witness admitted that Martin had stated that the )
drilling requirements under the original lease "were: bur-(
densome and prohibitory" and that Martin "in subst{lnce /'
. . . again submitted the proposition that had been turned
down which called for the drilling of three wells at the expiration of the two years if the price were sixty cents. . . ."
According to the witness, the answer to this request was
"that at the expiration of two years I would require that
even though the price of oil be under sixty cents, there would
have to be three wells drilled."
The director who testified at the trial, Francis L. Cross,
testified that at the conference ":Mr. Tognazzini and :Mr. Martin did all the talking, :Mr. Cooke and I merely sat in and listened to the conversation." His recollection of the discussion
between Martin and Tognazzini was substantially the same
as that of Tognazzini. This witness also testified that Martin
brought up the question of a modification of the drilling requirement after the end of the two-year suspension period
in the form of the plan outlined in the Twitchell letter, but
that "Mr. Tognazzini told him unequivocally that that was
out."
The deposition of the third director, F. O. Cooke, who did
not testify at the trial, remains for consideration. He stated
that paragraph 7 of the original lease was not mentioned at
the conference; that Martin did not state that the lessee
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wanted, in addition to a two-year suspension, "a modification
of the lease so that they would [thereafter] only be required
to complete three wells a year." When asked on cross-examination whether Martin suggested a modification along the
lines of the Twitchell plan, Cooke stated that "1 don't recol·
lect. I think I will stand on that."
The foregoing evidence shows that there is support either
for the conclusion that the question of modification of the
drilling requirements after a two-year suspension of drilling
was .not raised at the San Francisco conference or for the
conclusion that Martin suggested at the 'conference that the
original lease should be modified along the lines outlined in
the previous tentative understanding between Martin and
Twitchell and that this suggestion was rejected.
In any event the points to be covered in a supplemental
agreement were not decided npon in San Francisco. The
negotiation continued by letters thereafter, and those letters
comprehensively cover all the points finally agreed upon by
the parties. The evidence is without conflict that the parties
were unable to agree on the question of drilling requirements
until some time after the San Francisco meeting.
The Twitchell plan should not be confused with the modi.
fication of drilling requirements proposed by Tognazzini in
his letters of January 16, 1940, and January 25, 1940, ac·
cepted by Moore in his letter of January 29, 1940. The
Twitchell plan reduced the drilling requirements to three
wells a year when the price of oil was over 60 cents a barrel
and suspended all drilling requirements except with respect
to otIset wells when the price of oil was below 60 cents a bar·
rel and when other market conditions prevailed. This is the
plan rejected by defendant. The counter proposal by Tog·
'nazzini was essentially different from the Twitchell plan in
that Moore's drilling obligation (except for o1Iset wells) was
reduced to the drilling of three wells a year after two years
·and Moore was to drill these three wells regardless of the price
of oil and other market conditions. This plan was not im·
mediately accepted by Moore, for he wanted more concessions.
(Moore's letter of January 25, 1940.) The concessions were
refused, and in his letter of January 25, 1940, Tognazzini
repeated the offer of January 16, 1940. This offer was aceepted by Moore in his letter of January 29, 1940.
[Sa] Defendant contends that a general finding that all
allegations of plaintiff's complaint not found to be true are
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untrue, is in effect a finding that at the San Francisco con- .
ference modification of the drilling requirements of the lease
after a two-year suspension was not discussed because plaintiff alleged that it was discussed. Defendant cannot rely on
the specific findings of the trial court with reference to this
conference, however, for there is nothing in those findings
to indicate that the parties agreed that clause 7 was not to
be modified, and nothing therein from which a reasonable
inference could be drawn in conflict with the letters. The
evidence as to what occurred at the San Francisco conference
was in conflict, and the findings may be construed to the effect that there was no discussion at that time of any modification of the drilling requirements of the lease after a two-year
suspension. It does not follow, however, that it is reasonable
to draw an inference that the modification of the drilling
requirements was never discussed by the parties or their
representatives. The evidence is without dispute that the
modification of the lease was discussed by Martin and Twitchell before the conference, but that the plan for a modification
was rejected. The evidence is without dispute that on Martin's return to California to continue negotiations, he was
informed by Tognazzini before the conference in question
that this plan was rejected. A few days after the conference,
he wrote a letter again proposing a modification of paragraph 7. The proposal was again rejected, but the modification of the drilling requirements of paragraph 7 was considered in virtually every letter between the representatives
of the parties. All this evidence is without conflict.
Only if the letters are disregarded could an inference be
drawn from the testimony with respect to the San Francisco
conference, that the parties never considered the modification
of paragraph 7 and consequently did not intend clause 2 of
the supplemental contract to be the measure of the lessee'8
drilling obligations. The letters cannot be disregarded, for
the trial court found that they were mailed and received.
[4] There is no authority for the proposition that such an
inference must be drawn to sustain the judgment. The defendant relies on the majority opinion in Estate of Rule, 25
Ca1.2d 1, 10-11 [152 P.2d 1003, 155 A.L.R. 1319], but that
case is not authority for such a conclusion. The doctrine of
the Rule case is that, "in tke absence of findings of fact and
conclusions of law, every intendment is in favor of the judgment or order appealed from and it is presumed that every
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fact or inference essential to the support of the order an
warranted by the evidence was found by the court. . . . The
rule is that an 'appellate court will accept or adhere to
interpretation [of a contract] adopted by the trial court-and
not substitute another of its own-. . . where parol evidence:
was introduced in aid of its interpretation, and such evidence
• . . is such that conflicting inferences may be drawn ther
from.''' (Italics added.) It is clear that this doctrine .1i
inapplicable to the present case, for the trial court made ex;
tensive findings and conclusions of law with respect to th~
negotiations, including the letters and the interlening con-,
ference, and it cannot be assumed that the letters were nof
considered, for they were virtually incorporated into the find-;
ings. To apply the doctrine of the Rule case it would be~'
necessary to infer that because there was no discussion of the,:
modification at the San Francisco conference such a modifica-.
tion was never considered by the parties, and then to infer:<
further that the parties did not intend such a modification. '
lab] Since the letters, which show that the parties consid.,'
ered such a modification, were found by the trial court to be'
mailed and received, the evidence is not reasonably suscepti-:
ble of an inference that would support the judgment. (See
Estate of Platt, 21 Cal.2d 343, 352 [131 P.2d 825] ; Eastman
Oil etc. Corp. v. Lane-WeUs Co., 21 Cal.2d 872, 875 [136 P.2d
564].)
[6] The defendant also contends that the judgment of
the trial court is supported by the rule of construction embodied in Civil Code, section 1654 that "In cases of uncer-'
'tainty not removed by the preceding rules [including section,
1647 that a contract may be explained by reference to the;
circumstances under which it was made]. the language of a ;
eontract should be interpreted most strongly against the I
party who caused the uncertainty to exist. The promisor is '\
presumed to be such party. . . ." This rule on its face canDot support the judgment in the present case. Clearly it \
cannot be applied against the lessee as the promisor, for a!
llesic issue in the case is who was the promisor. Nor can it be
aid that the lessee caused the uncertainty to exist, for the
evidence is without conflict that the precise modification was
suggested by defendant's president in language that was
eopied almost verbatim into the formal document.s

the

-It haa been 8uggested that thia modification was proposed b, Martin
ill a letter clated J811uar.r 11, 1940. AD esamination of that letter, how-
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Defendant also contends that a reasonable inference might
bc drawn in support of the trial court's conclusion from the
fact that the formal document was drawn up by Moore's attorney. The basis for this contention seems to be that Martin as a competent attorney should have known that the lease
would be interpreted in favor of defendant, and that, therefore, unless he intended that interpretation, he would have
inserted certain words that would have removed any uncertainty. Such an inference, however, assumes that Martin was
aware of the ambiguity. The provision in question was taken
from Tognazzini's letter of January 16th. That letter seems
clear and unambiguous, and when considered in the context
thereof, the provision itself likewise appears clear and unambiguous. There is no reason to assume that Martin was
any more aware of the possibility of this ambiguity than Tognazzini, who suggested the modification and who signed the
formal document without suggesting any changes in the disputed provision. There is no reason to assume that Tognaz2ini is any less competent than Martin, and it is difficult to
comprehend why he did not insert into his proposal or into
the formal document the words that defendant now claims
must be read into the instrument. It certainly is not reasonable to· support the judgment of the trial court on the basis
of some appraisal of the relative competence of these two men.
The determination of the trial court that the lease as modified is capable of only one construction and that the parties
intended that the drilling requirement of paragraph 7 would
not be modified by clause 2 of the "Supplemental Contract"
are without support in the evidence or any reasonable inference from the evidence. The specific findings as to the negotiations, and the evidence, which is without conflict in any
essential element and not reasonably susceptible of conflicting
inferences, show clearly that the parties intended to modify
paragraph 7 of the original lease. It follows that the trial
court's construction of the lease is erroneous.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. In the briefs of the parties, the
opinion of the District Court of Appeal (173 P.2d 700)
~d the majority opinion of this court, we find an aggreever, Bee footnote 2, 81Ipra, reveals that the modification there suggested,
based on the price of oil and other JIllIrket toDditions, was clearly not
the modi1ieatioD incorporated into the "Sullplemental Contract."
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gate of hundreds of pages of legal discussion. And, unfortu·
nately, all of it together is of little benefit to the parties 0'
to the law because in the final analysis the sole determinative
question, in the view of the majority of this court, at least~
relates only to sufficiency of the evidence to support findingS;
of the trial court and its construction of a written agreement.,
Apologetically I add to the fruitless discussion, impeUe
thereto by the unrelenting conviction that the loser in any
lawsuit on appeal is entitled to an adequate and fair factual
statement by the reviewing court and to a decision which
'.:t
reckons with the record as it is.
Reading of the entire record convinces me that in reality;
the majority of this court reach their result not becauseJ
the evidence as a matter of law is insufficient to sustain an/:,
essential finding of fact or the trial court's construction 0(1
the agreement but because, after weighing the sharply and'
substantially conflicting evidence, they have concluded that,(
as they view it, the greater weight of the evidence favors
plaintiff and, hence, that the justice of the cause demands a
reversal of the judgment. I am unable to concur in a judg·'
ment of reversal which on any fair statement of the evidence~
call be supported on no other theory.
j
The facts essential to an adequate understanding of the'
controversy are few and simple. The plaintiff oil company:
is lessee by assignment under an oil lease executed by defend~
ant owner·lessor; the lease was modified and augmenteJ by'
a supplemental agreement affecting the drilling obligations
of the lessee; a dispute subsequently arose as to whether the
provisions of the original lease relative to the number of
strings of drilling tools to be operated continuously were
abrogated and replaced by a provision of the supplemental
agreement relative to a minimum number of wells to be COfn.
pleted each year. To determine that dispute this action for
declaratory relief was brought.
Since, as above indicated, the issues in this case are either
actually factual or are made so by the majority opinion, it
becomes important at once to recognize what those issues are,
what the evidence is, and, in particular, to set out in haec
verba the language which the parties used and which is the
subject of construction.
Plaintiff in its petition for hearing declares that •• The heart
of the controversy is the clause of the original lease fixing
the lessee's drilling obligations after the discovery of oil and
gas in paying quantities. That clause, No.7, specified (1)
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the total number of wells that the lessee was to driB-one
well to each ten acres [of a 6700 acre leasel-and (2) the
rate at which the lessee was to drill this number, ..:lamely:
'Lessee agrees to continuously operate one string of tools
with due diligence for the first year after such discovery,
two strings of tools for the second year after such discovery, three strings of tools for the third year after such
discovery, four strings of tools for the fourth year after
such discovery, and five strings of tools thereafter until the
drilling requirements herein specified are complied with.' "
The foregoing requirement for operating, progressively, one
to five strings of tools I I imposed on the lessee the burden of
spending from $180,000 the first year to $900,000 in the fifth
and each subsequent year." The lease, as previously indicated, covers some 6,700 acres of land and, hence, nnless
surrendered in whole or in part, will entail the drilling of
some 670 wells plus, possibly, conditionally required offset
wells. Such original lease does not appear on its face to be
unfair in any respect; it sets up various reciprocal rights and
obligations in considerable detail; the drilling schedule above
quoted is not an absolute obligation of the lessee; it can be
relieved therefrom at any time by surrendering the lease and
its rights thereunder; there is provision also for temporary
suspension of its drilling obligations under certain specified
conditions.
The actual nub of this controversy lies in the present lessee's claim that the "Supplemental Contract" eliminates completely and permanently the above quoted original contract
provisions relative to the number of strings of tools to be
operated in developing the property. The language of the
"Supplemental Contract" so relied upon by the plaintUIlessee, and now by the majority of the court, is as follows:
"It is agreed between Union Sugar Company . . . and E. H.
Moore, Inc., . . . that oil and gas lease dated April 8, 1936,
from Union Sugar Company, lessor, to Sovereign Oil Corporation, lessee . . . be, and same is hereby, modified in the
following respects, to-wit:
" (1) All obligations to drill additional wells, except offset wells, are hereby suspended for a period of two years from
February 1, 1940.
"(2) At the expiration of said two year period, Moore
shall be obligated to complete three. wells per year.
11 C.2d-ll
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"(3) Numerical Paragraph Nine (9) of the lease [relating to offset wells] of April 8, 1936, shall be modified by
striking out '250 feet' wherever the same appears therein,
and inserting in lieu thereof' 330 feet.'
"(4) Commencing from the date of this supplemental
contract, Moore agrees to pay a minimum royalty of $25,000.00
per year, payable monthly in advance, and said royalty shall
be charged against the total oil reserves during the course!
of the life of the lease j that is to say, Moore shall be entitled
to all oil and/or gas produced from said lease, or the prol!eeds
thereof, until it is fully reimbursed from lessors' one-eighth
royalty interest for the minimum royalty so paid.
" (5) Except insofar as the provisions of the lease of
April 8, 1936, are in conflict herewith, the same shall remain
in full force and effect."
Particularly is it to be neted that the above-quoted supplemental agreement is utterly silent as to the number of strings
of tools to be operated after the drilling holiday. It provides
that "(1) All obligations to drill additional wells, except
offset wells, are hereby suspended for a period of two year,
from February 1, 1940." (Italics added.) The holiday, according to its terms, is a temporary suspension or moratorium, not an abrogation for the entire remaining term of the
lease. But the effect of the majority holding is not to enforce
any two-year suspension of the terms of the original lease;
it is rather to permanently abrogate, insofar as the terms of
the original lease are concerned, "All obligations to drill additional wells, except offset wells" j that is to say, by the majority holding the drilling obligations (other than for offset
wells) declared in the original lease are completely eliminated and the only drilling obligation· (except for offset wells)
now operative is that stated in the "Supplemental Contract,"
which is to II compZete three wells per year." (Whether in
the view of the majority any offset wells completed during
a year should be credited on the "complete-three-wells" program does not clearly appear.) The supplemental agreement
language is: "(2) At the expiration of said two year period,
:Moore shall be obligated to complete three wells per year."
(Italics added.) This language, viewed in its context, would
leem to me to mean that "at the expiration" of the two-year
.uspension of "All obligations to drill additional wells, exeept offset wells," the lessee was to be obligated, regardless
of the price of oil, of the number of strings of tools otherwise
required to be operated, of the depth of hole required, of the
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----------------------------------------------chal'acter of formation encountered, or, etc., to, at the least,

)

"complete three wells per year." (The same paragraph of
the lease (No.7) which provides for the number of strings
of tools to be continuously operated after discovery of oil
also provides that "The Lessee shall be entitled to drill as
many additional wells on said land and premises as it desires. ")
Certainly it cannot successfully be contended that the language of the supplemental contract precludes the meaning
above suggested. If that meaning is not precluded by such
language we are bound to accept it for it was found by the
trial court to be the true meaning of the language and the
true agreement of the parties and such finding is amply supported by both direct and circumstantial evidence. As recounted hereinafter in more detail the record shows that Mr.
Cooke, a director of defendant-lessor who participated in the
negotiations leading up to the modification agreement, testified in respect to the terms agreed upon that "if we were
going to give them a release on drilling of wells for two years
... that they had to start and drill at least-l want to make
particular emphasis on that word 'at least'~three wells a
year. . . . [AnuJ if the price of oil was more than 60 cents
... we expected them to go ahead on the original lease, unde,.
that Clause Seven. . . . [Italics added.] [T]hree wells were
to be drilled [per year] . . . Regardless of whether the price
of oil was 60 cents or less." Likewise, as hereinafter shown
in more particularity, the witness Cross testified as to the
terms of modification agreed upon that "if they were given
a two year suspension, would have to agree to drill and complete at least three wells per year if the price of oil was under
sixty cents. . . . There was absolutely no discussion of Paragraph seven of the lease. . . . " Any failure to discuss paragraph 7 at this time would seem to me to indicate that the
repeated earlier refusals of defendant's directors to modify
the drilling covenants beyond the two-year moratorium were
accepted by Mr. Martin as final; and insofar as Martin may
haYe again attempted to bring the subject up the positive
refusal by defendant's directors to give it further consideration (as suggested by evidence hereinafter quoted) is likewise suggestive that the supplemental agreement means what
it says rather than what the majority now interpolate into it.
I look in vain to the supplemental agreement for a provision saying that "the suspension of-' All obligations to drill
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additional wells, except offset wells' is hereby made perma-,:,
nent"; or that "the provisions of the original lease requir"~
ing the continuous operation with due diligence of five strings ,.
of tools 'until the drilling requirements herein specified [one
well to each 10 acres] are complied with,''' are suspended
and inoperative not only for two years but for the entire
remainder of the term of the lease. I look in vain for the'
above but I find, "(5) Except insofar as the provisions of the '
lease of April 8, 1936, are in conflict herewith, the same shall ~
remain in full force and effect."
It is obvious from an inspection of the original lease and .1.
of the supplemental agreement that the latter on its face, !
construed as it must be with the document which it avowedly .
supplements, does not purport to support the theory of, or
the result reached in, the majority opinion; it does not ap~
pear to be ambiguous or uncertain or to admit of the construction or effect now urged by plaintiff; on its face it does
appear to fully sustain the construction given it by the trial
court. Nevertheless, says plaintiff, if the extrinsic evidence
is considered,I the only reasonable conclusion which can be
drawn from it is that the parties to the lease really agreed to
modify and supplement it in one element at least which is
drastically different from anything which the language used
aeems calculated to delineate. In fact, the plaintiff urges, and
the majority opinion now argues, that the major object which
the plainti1P sought to obtain in consenting to any change
in the original lease was a permanent release, rather than a
fwo-yea,. suspension, of its drilling obligations as provided
hi. the original lease. The vast difference between a two-year
auspension of the agreed drilling obligations and complete
nlease therefrom with substitution of a mere three-well yearly
completion schedule will at once be apparent to anyone who
lias any intimate acquaintance. with the oil production busiBeSS and who pauses to consider the facts of this case.
Bere we have a 6,700 acre lease with the lessee obligated,
.,. the terms of the lease as originally executed, to develop
tlle land with reasonable expedition by continuous operation
.turing the fifth and subsequent years after discovery of oil

.1

lFor the purposes of this dissent the admissibility of such extrinsic
eridenee is a88umed but this does not imply accord with the holding
tlat it was properly admitted.
IThe word plaintiff is used herein interchangeably as denoting either
fie present plaintiff or its predece880r in interest under the leaae from
Wendant.
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or gas in paying quantities, of five strings of tools "with due
diligence." How many wells might be completed each year
by the operation of five strings of tools 'is, of course, a variable. Whether one hole Can be completed in three weeks,
three months or three years depends not only on the diligence
and skill of the workers but also on the type of equipment
used, the character of the geological formations encountered
and the depth of the oil sand from which production, if any,
eventually is obtained. There is evidence here that the operation of five strings might produce as many as 15 wells a year;
it could, of course, complete less than three. At 15 wells a
year to fully develop the lease (without allowance for unusual
delays) would require approximately 45 years. If plaintiff
prevails and can maintain the lease by completing only three
wells a year-if that is tantamount to saying it need drill
only three holes a year-it will require 223 years to put defendant's land on full production! With such a seemingly
absurd result, from defendant's standpoint, to be made possible from the interpretation urged by plaintiff, and with that
interpretation to be read into language which does not, by
itself, even remotely suggest it, one should expect that the
eyidence requiring such ,a construction (if, indeed, there be
any known theory of law which permits it) must indeed be
overwhelming and without conflict. But in truth the most
that can be said for plaintiff is that the evidence is in sharp
conflict.
The majority opinion on its very ,face recites evidence
which, if fairly analyzed, according to all heretofore accepted
standards would require that the findings of the trial court
and its construction of the contracts be sustained. Such discussion of the evidence as appears in the majority opinion,
insofar as it is objective, is obviously argumentative as to the
differing inferences which may be drawn from the evidence.
In other words the thesis of the majority opinion constitutes
a mere argument on the weight of the evidence, the resolution of its conflicts, and the selection of inferences to be drawn
therefrom, matters which are no concern of a reviewing court.
But my greatest quarrel with the majority opinion comes not
from evidence which it discusses but, rather, from evidence
which it leaves unquoted.
The record discloses that at the time of the negotiations
for the modifications to the lease the following circumstances
existed: The then lessee, E. H. Moore, Incorporated, a one-
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man corporation, was dissatisfied with marketing conditions
at the defendant '8 field. Moore was dissatisfied largely because the present lessee (plaintiff here) was the only crude
oil purchaser available and, as such, had fixed an arbitrarily
low price which Moore had no alternative but to accept if
he was to produce and market oil in that field. By way
of remedying that situation Moore conceived the plan of
building a refinery at the field so that he could handle his
own production. According to the record a two-year moratorium or "holiday" in drilling requirements would enable
him to devote toward the building of a 'refinery some
$1,800,000 in cash which otherwise might have to be expended
in drilling new wells. Although at that time the oil company was offering less than 60 cents a barrel for the oil being
produced by Moore from defendant's field, and although
the obligation of the lessee to operate the five strings of
tools was suspended while the price was below 60 cents,
there was, of course, nothing to prevent the oil company
from raising the price to 60 cents or more at any time it
saw fit so to do. To the end of securing some modification
in the drilling program-at least security against having to
drill any but offset wells for a two-year period during which
a refinery might be built-Moore commenced negotiations
with representatives of defendant. In most of these negotiations Moore was represented by Mr. Villard Martin, an
attorney at law. In the initial negotiations Mr. Martin
broached the matter to Mr. Edmunds Lyman, who was then
president of the defendant lessor; Mr. Lyman referred Mr.
Martin to Mr. T. A. Twitchell, an attorney at law; Mr. Martin thereupon conferred with Mr. Twitchell and stated the
desires of the Moore Company; Mr. Twitchell then prepared
a memorandum of the proposition suggested by Martin and
forwarded it to the offices of the lessor at San Francisco.
This proposition is sometimes referred to in the record and
herein as the "Twitchell deal" or proposal, and because of
the repeated references to it by some of the witnesses at
the trial its _substance is of importance to bear in mind in
any appraisal of the sufficiency or weight of the evidence
relative to supporting or failing to support the judgment.
Mr. Twitchell, in his report to the lessor (under date of
October 14, 1939, received in evidence as plaintiff's Exhibit
No.5), said: "Mr. Villard Martin, attorney for Mr. Moore,
was here Thursday discussing the possibility of modifying
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the oil and gas lease between the company as lessor, and Mr.
Moore as lessee. Mr. Moore desires to construct a topping
plant to handle the oj} from the lease, but does not desire
to spend the money required to build this plant if he has
to comply with the existing drilling requirements of the
lease. If Moore constructs a topping plant it will be to the
advantage of the Union Sugar Company because it will create
an outlet for oil, and this in turn will mean immediate reve·
nue for the company as lessor....
"I informed Mr. Martin that I would submit the proposal
to you, and that you in turn would submit it to the Board
of Directors.
"Mr. Martin originally proposed to modify the drilling
requirements so that Mr. Moore would only be required to
develop the lease in accordance with good oil field practice.
Many. old oil leases did not contain any express drilling requirements, and in those leases the Courts uniformly held
that there was an implied obligation to drill when conditions
warranted further drilling. . . .
"I informed Mr. Martin that I could not recommend that
the lease be modified in this way. After discussion, we arrived at the following tentative plan:
"I. . The Union Sugar Company shall agree to suspend
all drilling obligations for a period of two years, except the
obligation to drill offset wells. . . .
"2. The existing proven area, comprising some 400 acres,
would be zoned and in that zone, after two years, Moore
would be required to drill 3 wells per year, provided that
the price of oil is 60c or more per barrel at the well. . . .
"The provision calling for three wells per year was inserted because three wells per year would be all that Moore
would be required to drill, assuming that he was operating
with one string of tools. Martin said he might desire to drill
three wells all at one time under contract, rather than to
allow 90 days to elapse between wells, as provided in the lease.
"3. Moore would not be obligated to drill any additional
wells . . . outside of the proven area, unless oil should be
discovered on the property or or adjacent property at such
locations that it would appear probable that oil could be discovered and produced from a portion of the unproven area...•
"I also believe that it would be advisable to provide that
the agreement would be null and void if Moore assigned or
transferred the lease to some third person. • •.• "
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It is obvious from mere perusal of the above-quoted report that even the "Twitchell deal," although it definitely
called for a modification of the five-strings-of-tools development program, certainly contemplated more extensive drilling
obligations than the three-wells-a-year now held by the majority to have been agreed upon. But as will appear from evidence hereinafter quoted the "Twitchell deal" was rejected
by the defendant's directors because they would not grant
such an extensive release from the drilling obligations declared in the original lease. Following the Twitchell report
Mr. Lyman was succeeded by Mr. Tognazzini as president of.
the Union Sugar Company, and Mr. Martin arranged for a
conference directly with Mr. Tognazzini. The latter called
in Mr. Cooke and Mr. Cross, directors of the defendant company, and the conference was held at the Stock Exchange
Club in San Francisco, on December 20, 1939.
According to Mr. Tognazzini's testimony Mr. Martin
~'asked me about the modification, what action had been
taken on the proposal that had been submitted to us by Mr.
Twitchell.... And I told him that the proposition had been
turned down cold by the Board of Directors.... Mr. Martin I
opened up the subject again about a modification and he
elaborated at length on the large amount of money that had
been expended by E. H. Moore, Incorporated, and the difficulties that they had encountered in disposing of the oil,
stating that the arrangements as they existed in the Santa
Maria Field by virtue of the only outlet being that of the
Union Oil Company, had made it unsatisfactory . . . . He
stated that they needed to obtain an outlet and one method
would be to establish a refinery or some similar institution
of their own; that they had gone to the expense of discussing
the same with a firm of engineers in Los Angeles; that they
were prepared to go ahead with that, but in view of the
large sum of money that would have to be expended for the
erection of a refinery, and that he thought there was a possibility of the price of oil going up again, that he wished
to have the lease modified so that there would be a complete
IAlSpension of drilling operations for two years. . . . I told
JUm that most of the leases in the Santa Maria Valley Field
were more favorable to the lessor than that which the Union
Sugar Company had...• I told him further, as I recall, that
die Union Oil Company controlled that field, that I was inttignant over the attitude of the Union Oil Company who
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had had a posted price of seventy cents in that field; . . •
that any analysis disclosed that there were twenty-three or
twenty-four oil fields throughout the State of California
the price on which oil of comparable gravity was within a
few cents of this seventy cent range ; that the Union Oil
Company, for reasons best known to themselves, arbitrarily
reduced the price of oil in this particular field which they
controlled to below fifty cents; that in no other field in the
State of California would you find a comparable reduction
or price for comparable oil. . . . I told him further that he
might be of the opinion that the price of oil would go up,
which would necessitate a resumption of drilling, but I was
going to protect the interests of the Union Sugar Company
in the event the price of oil did not go up. So I made it
very clear to him that 80 far as we were concerned, we would
permit, if all parties could agree upon the terms. and conditions of this two year suspension. They were under no obligation to drill anyway. It was only on a basis of an anticipated increase in the price of oil that they might have to drill
at this particular stage of the game. I told him that in the
event we could agree that there must be a prOvision whereby
there would be the drilling of three wells per year when the
price of· oil was below sixty cents. We did not arrive at that
particular meeting at the monetary consideration to be paid
to us. I advanced the theory that there was proven production and whatever monetary consideration would be given
to us was really not a consideration for the reason that it
would be only an advance of money to us on our own production or proven oil reserves to be charged against those
reserves as time went on. That statement came about in
answer to this unit plan or some such plan that had been
discussed in the Twitchell letter and again had been discussed almost verbatim at this meeting.••. "
The witness continued, •• Since Twitchell's letter is in the
testimony, I guess we can refer to it. In the Twitchell letter there was a statement made that they be permitted, or
that there be a suspension of drilling requirements for two
years and at the expiration of that time, if the price of oil
be sixty cents or more, that three wells be drilled.
•• Q. Yes' A. At this meeting I took just the opposite position because we turned down that proposition cold, that at the
expiration of two years three wells must be completed if the
price of oil be below sixty cents. That'l all we were talking
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about. That's all that I was talking about, and that there ~
this minimum revenue coming in, not only during the two
years which was a condition for the suspension for a two year
period in order to give relief in the event the price of oil
went up, in view of the contemplated erection of a refineri,
that at the expiration of that two year period if the price
of oil still be below sixty cents, then I wanted three wella
to be drilled on that property per year. . . .
~~
" Q. Was anything said during that discussion as to
what drilling requirements would be if the price of oil waS
above sixty cents after the expiration of the two year period
A. No, nothing whatsoever. We had turned down the prop-,
osition that there be three wells drilled if the price were
over sixty cents. The lease provisions prevailed if the price
were over sixty cents. What was being asked was a respite;
for two years because of the fear that the price of oil was',.
going to go up again which then would require the drilling;
and producing of that field. Now that's what the whole'
discussion was about at this particular meeting and the i
proposition was made, or the play on our sympathies was:
made, showing how much money had been expended, how:
they were unable to have an outlet because of the activities
of the Union Oil Company in that particular field and how.
therefore it was necessary for them to erect a refinery in.
order to obtain an outlet of their own. And while they were'
erecting all that, going to all that further expense, Mr. Mar- .
tin stated definitely he anticipated an increase in the price
of oil. In that respect he was correct, because there was an ,
increase in the early part of 1941.
I
"Q. Did they, as a matter of fact, erect a refinery f A.
No."
In corroboration of the testimony of Mr. Tognazzini we
find the testimony of Mr. Cooke:
"As I say, we were gathered downstairs, and Mr. Martin
said he had come here at the instance of Mr. Moore to see
if something could not be done to help out the situation,
which was getting rather critical at that time.
"Q. Did he explain in what respect the situation was
getting critical, do you recall T A. Yes, the oil situation had
changed there and he found he needed relief, one way or another; had to have relief from drilling some oil wells he should
have to drill under his contract, and he stressed quite a point
on that; that he would like us to consider mli.cing some
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change in that, and that he would probably have to put in
a refinery. That was the thing that struck me. There were
two or three things Martin had on his mind. One was, he
figured, he tried to get it over to all of us, that Mr. Moore
would have to spend a lot of money for this refinery, and if
he did that he felt he should have some relief on the drilling
of the wells.
"Q. Did he explain why he thought he would have to
have a refinery! A. Yes, there was no way of getting his
oil out at that time; the marketing conditions bothered him.
Mr. Tognazzini did most of the talking to him at that time.
We really sat back and listened, except whfon it got near the
end we went in on a few things, made some_~ugg(t~ons and
worked them out, and as far as I remember~o you want
me to try and dig up some of the statements f
"MR. BRANDT: As far as the sum and substancl of it
goes. A. (Continuing:) The sum and substance was: You
must realize we had had nothing under this oil business, and
we felt that we should have an adjustment made there that
was fair to us and fair to the Moore people. If I remember
rightly, they started to and drilled approximately, when they
asked for this meeting, I think it was twelve wells, and out
of these 12 wells, I think 10 were operating and 2 were dry,
or not in good condition. I don't know the technical condition, but they were not on production, let's say that, and he,
Mr. Martin, seemed to feel that we should give them this
2-year extension whereby they didn't drill any wells. They
wanted relief. Well, we didn't give them any definite answer
at that time, because there were other things he was going
to bring up-Mr. Tognazzini was going to bring up-and
that was the matter of us getting some money on a royalty
basis. We felt we should have that, and also we felt if we
were goiJ,lg to give them a release on drilling of wells for two
years, that under no circumstances were we going to allow
them at the end of that time not to live up to their agreement, that they positively had to live up to their agreement,
which was, in fact, that they had to start and drill at leastI want to make particular emphasis on that word 'at least'three wells a year.
"Q. At the end of the two years! A. At the end of the
two years....
"Q. Did Mr. Tognazzini in the conversation refer to
, I
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the extent of the acreage leased' A. Yes, I think he mentioned that we had leased Mr. :Moore some 6700 acres.
cCQ. That they were included in the lease' A. Included
in the lease.
"Q. Do you recall whether anything was said concern-'
ing the then price of oil' A. He was very insistent on '
that point, because, as I remember, he made the stateDl:ent'
that no matter what the price of oil was, that the :Moore ,
Company were still obligated to drill three wells-at least)
three wells-a year, irrespective of the price of oil. . . .
"Q. And did :Mr. :Martin, as you recall, mention the pos-'
&ibility that oil might increase in price while' building their
refinery' A. Yes, he did.
"Q. What did he say in that connection' A. He said
that he would like to have two years and be released from
that drilling, but he said the oil might go up-I don't think '
he said any particular price as to what the oil might go up
to-but we came right back to the same thing, that irre- ,
spective of the price of oil we still say you will have to drill
at least three wells a year.
ceQ. Now, during the conversation was there anything
that you recall, Mr. Cooke, mentioned concerning the number of drilling rigs at any time' A.' No, no.
'c Q. Was there any mention that you can now recall con-' r
eerning Paragraph Seven of the lease as such' A. I think '
that was a clause-Seven, was it'
'c Q. Clause Seven' A. ClaUse Seven; no, no mention
at all.
" Q. Was there any discussion about the number of rigs
that were to be used after the expiration of the 2-year period'
A. No sir.
"Q. Did Mr. :Martin state to you people, you directors'
there and to Mr. TOgDszzini, that he wanted a suspension of
drilling operations for two years, and on top of that wanted :
• new agreement with respect to .future operations f ••• A. No.1
ceQ. Did Mr.:Martin ask that in addition to suspension,
that the lease be modified to reduce the number of strings ,
of tools required to be used or the number of wells to be
c1ril1ed' A. No.
,
"Q. Did Mr. :Martin say at that time that it was his pur-.
pose to secure a complete suspension for two years, and
thereafter secure a modification of the lease, so that they
would only be required to complete three wells a year' A. No.
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"Q. Did he say, did Mr. Martin say, he wanted to get
the lease modified so that they would not be required to keep
the number of strings of tools busy as provided in Paragraph Seven of the lease' A. No."
On cross-examination of Mr. Cooke by plaintiff's counsel,
he was shown a copy of Mr. Martin's testimony as given in
a deposition and an effort was made to break down his testimony. The record reBects the following:
"Q. I will again refer to Mr. Martin's deposition on
page 70. Mr. Martin stated: 'I told them I was up there to
get a modification of that lease.
" 'Q. What kind of a modification did you tell them you
were after'
.
" 'A. I told them I wanted to get that lease modified 80
that we would not be required to keep the number of strings
of tools busy that are provided for in Paragraph Seven of
the lease.'
" A. My answer to that is 'no.'
"Q. That he didn't make that statemenU A. No, he did
not make that statement....
"Q. And I will also ask you, then, if you recall, or if
you are prepared to state, that he didn't state at. the conference as follows: . . . •The discussion there was that after the
expiration of the 2-year period under this proposal that we
made there and this supplemental agreement we had submitted, we were going to have to drill three wells each year,
regardless.
"'Q. It was your proposition, then, to them that you
have a limit as to the number of wells after the expiration
of the two years"
"THE WITNESS: No, no.
"MR. POWELL: I am just reading, I have not come to the
point as yet in the question asked Mr. Martin in his deposition.
" 'A. That is right, three wells a year after the expiration
of the two years was the limit of our drilling requirements.'
"THE WITNESS: Ob no, no.
"MR. POWELL: Q. You are prepared to say definitely'
A. He is confused on that.
"Q. Are you prepared to say that Mr. Martin did Dot
make that statement' A. yes....
"Q. Then I will ask you, Mr. Cooke,- if at this conference
Mr. Martin stated that the only change in the lease they
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wanted was a suspension of two years in drilling' A.
years'
"Q. A two years' suspension in drilling obligations'
thlnk that is correct, yes.
H Q. He stated that was all that he was seekingt
A..
that time, yes.
"Q. A two years' suspension in drilling, nothing
A. No. . . .
, "Q. What was to happen if the price was more than
cents' A. That wasn't referred to at all. We, expected
to go ahead on the original lease, under thai Clause
that you speak of, but Moore never mentioned Clause
"Q. You stated just now that three wells were to be
regardless of the price of oil, I think that is your precise
,i
guage. Do you mean regardless of whether the price
less or more than 60 cents a barrel' A. Regardless of wheth~:
the price of oil was 60 cents or less." ,
I,~
The foregoing quoted matters from the testimony of tli~e.
witness Cooke are only a part, but a fairly illustrative part,
of his positive and material testimony which the majoritY,
opinion dismisses as insufficient to create a substantial conilict in the evidence of surrounding circumstances from which,
circumstances such opinion interprets the "Supplemental'
Contract" to mean what the witness Martin asserts he asked',
for but which the contract does not state and which the witness Cooke, as well as the witness Tognazzini, testified Martin
in part did not ask for and in part asked for but was refused.
And the gist of the testimony of the witnesses Tognazzini,
and Cooke is corroborated by another witness, Mr. Francis L.";
Cross, a member of the State Bar and a director of the de-'
fendant-Iessor. Mr. Cross was among those present at the '\
San Francisco conference, which lasted "from around· noon,
to three-thirty, a quarter to four, sometime there." The'
transcript shows: "Q. Now can you give us, in substance,
Mr. Cross, your recollection of that discussion' What did 0
Mr. Martin, in substance say, and what did Mr. Tognazzini, l
in substance say'
"A.. Well sir, Mr. Martin discussed the question of the oil ,
lease he had with us and that at the time it was very onerous; ;
that they had spent a substantial amount of money on this
lease and they weren't very happy in that regard. That was
the sum and substance of what he had to say.
WA'W.........
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"Q. Did he say anything about a refinery t A. Yes, he
spoke of building a refinery in rather positive terms, had
an engineering architect .who was going ahead with this refinery.
" Q. Yes, well, did he make any suggestions as to what he
wanted t A. Mr. Martin spoke of these matters first and
stated that they wanted a two year suspension of a drilling
clause.
" Q. Yes t A. They wanted relief for two years from having to drill. That was the sum and substance of his entire
conversation, the crux of it.
"Q. What, if anything, did Mr. Tognazzini say' A. Well,
Mr. Tognazzini did quite a bit of talking and. told Mr. Moore
that he was new in the Union Sugar Company, which was
a fact, and was looking after the interests of the Union Sugar
Company and he went into great lengths to show what had
happened in the Gato Ridge to his cousin, Lario Tognazzini,
and he was not going to allow the Union Sugar Company to
get in that same position; that he wanted some payment. No
payment was mentioned,-no specific payment was mentioned
but that he wanted some payment and that in any event the
Oil Company, E. H. Moore, Inc., if they were given a two
year suspension, would have to agree to drill and complete
at least three wells per year if the price of oil was under sixty
cents.
I I Q.
And was there any discussion as to what drilling
'Would be required at the expiration of the two year period,
during the period when the price was above sixty cents'
A. There was absolutely no discussion of ·that at all. It
wasn't mentioned.
"Q. Was there any discussion that you recall concerning
Paragraph Seven of the lease' A. There was absolutely no
discussion of Paragraph Seven of the lease.
" Q. Was there anything said that you recall at that conference concerning the number of drilling rigs to be used'
A.No, I don't recall any mention of any drilling rigs or
anything like that. t t
It is also significant to note that on cross-examination of
Mr. Cross the following appears: "Now, Mr. Cross, I understand from you that all Mr. Martin wanted was a two year
Suspension in drilling; nothing else ~
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"A. Mr. Martin talked about getting relief for two
It is true that during this conversation he brought up
Twitchell deal, that they had been trying to put through
Twitchell. Mr. Tognazzini told him unequivocally that
was out." The unequivocal refusal to consider "the
deal" imports a refusal by defendant-lessor to consider
three-well-a-year proposal as a substitute for the more S'PElCltic"1
drilling operations provided for in the lease.
Again on cross-examination Mr. Cross was asked, ,
did Mr. Martin ask for any reduction in the drilling
ments at the expiration of the two yearsT" And he .. n,,,'W,~....tI
.. No," with the explanation that "He . . . tried to bring
[the Twitchell deal] up again, the deal that he wanted to
put over with the Union Sugar Company that was turned
down. He again brought that up and was again turned
down. . . . "
In what is essentially an argument directed at the
of conflicting evidence Justice Traynor declares, .. Only if the
letters are disregarded could an inference be drawn from:
the testimony with respect to the San Francisco COIlfe:relllce.
that the parties never considered the modification of paragraph 7 and consequently did not intend clause 2 of the
Supplemental Contract to be the measure of the lessee's
ing obligations. The letters cannot be disregarded, for the
trial court found that they were mailed and received. There
is no authority for the proposition that such an inference,
must be drawn to sustain the judgment." The above-quoted
argument misses the point completely. The evidence in the
record which I have above referred to and quoted in part
was not relied on by the trial judge, as "support for an in·ference that the parties never considered such a modification."
Exactly the contrary is true. The evidence is positive to the
point that Mr. Martin, representing Mr. Moore, requested"
"such a modification" originaUy and repeatedly and that.
such request was rejected and refused by the directors of '
defendant corporation. Only in the sense that they absolutely
refused such proposal by Mr. Martin did they decline to "consider" it. They did so refuse to consider it, in that sense, and
apparently they continued to so refuse down to and including ,
the time when the modification agreement was executed.
The oral testimonies of the directors show the terms of the
agreement which were discussed and tentatively accepted;
such testimonies show what was refused and what was Dot
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refused; their version of the conference corresponds with the
terms of the "Supplemental Contract" as it actually was
finally drafted and executed, 1Iot as plaintiff would now have
us "construe" or interpolate it. Obviously the inferences
to be drawn from such evidence, within all reasonable limits,
were for the trial court, not this court, to determine; and
surely it is within reasonable limits to draw the inference that
a proposed modification which was requested by Mr. Martin
and absolutely and positively rejected and refused by the
three directors of defendant corporation at the principal conference held would not be gratuitously or otherwise revived
and granted by those same directors when they came to
actually authorizing the amending contract. And, furthermore, if Tognazzini, acting alone, did talk ahout the matter
further, by letters or otherwise, it was for the trial judge to
determine from all the evidence (if any was admissible under
the circumstances) what terms were finally agreed upon.
The contract is itself evidence of its terms and of what the
parties intended; in its final form it was drafted by Martin;
the language was in large part the same as he had previously
proposed; language which he previously bad proposed to
secure more extensive modifications, or an abrogation, of the
drilling requirements of paragraph 7, significantly, was
omitted from the final draft. The weight of the contract
itself as evidence is completely ignored in the majority opinion but its significance as evidence is corroborated by the testimonies of Cooke and Cross and Tognazzini and by circumstantial evidence.
The fact that the court found that certain letters "were
mailed and received" does not appear to me to add anything
to the significance of those letters as evidence. Their weight
or significance here depends not on the fact of their having
been mailed and received but on what the trial court believed, and was supported by the evidence in believing, the
writer of the letters and their recipient understood was being
agreed upon by way of modification of or supplement to the
original lease. Just why statements in letters by Mr. Tognazzini should be overwhelming in weight while the oral
testimonies of Mr. Tognazzini, Mr. Cooke and Mr. Cross as to
what was tentatively agreed upon and what was' positively
rejected should be entitled to no weight at all is beyond me.
The fact is that the testimonies of Mr. Cross and Mr. Cooke
Bupport strongly (and amply as regards the duty of an appel-
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late court to affirm) the terms of the agreement as stated
the language of the contract as executed and as found by
trial court. The letters are not the contract which was
cuted. They are in evidence, like the oral testimony, sinl'pl~;JI
as parts of the surrounding circumstances. The letters tne'm~J.
selves are not free from ambiguities and self-contained
flicts. They are entitled to no greater weight than the
judge, in the light of all the evidence including his view of
parties, gave to them. Surely the formally executed
supported by the oral testimonies of the several wi1Gne;sses,
should be as competent evidence of what was meant by
letters as the letters are of what was meant by the contract.'
Surely, also, the persuasiveness of such evidence was a ques:.,
tion for the trial court, not for us. The oral testimony is en~'
titled to just as much weight, as far as we are concerned, as the
written letters. The ora] testimony strongly indicates that,'
the true contract is that which was actually reduced to writing
rather than that which is now by judicial fiat interpolated '.
therein.
A further example of weakness in the majority opinion is
found in its effort to explain away application of section 1654
of the Civil Code providing that" In cases of uncertainty not
removed ~ the preceding rules [including section 1647 that a contract may be explained by reference to the circumstances
under which it was made], the language of a contract should
be interpreted most strongly against the party who caused the
uncertainty to exist. The promissor is presumed to be such
party. . . . " After quoting the section as above, Justice Traynor's opinion asserts that "This rule On its face cannot support the judgment in the present case. Clearly it cannot be
applied against the lessee as the promissor, for a basic issue
in the case is who was the promissor. Nor can it be said that
the lessee caused the uncertainty to exist, for the evidence"
without conflict that the precise modification was suggested
by defendant'. president in language that was copied almost
verbatim into the formal document." (Italics added.) It is
true that the language" almost verbatim" is to be found fu the
letter written by "defendant's president." But it requires
very little more diligence in examining the record to ascertain
that an earlier lIOurce of the same language is a letter written
by plaintiff's lIr. Martin to defendant's Mr. Tognazzini. Mr.
Martin there says: "Dear Mr. Tognazzini: Delay in writing
you has been _ to Mr. Moore's and my absence from Tulsa.
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... I reported to him the substance of my conversation with
you and Messrs. Cook and Cross, and he asked that I write
you outlining briefly the terms of a supplemental contract
along the line of my conversation with you.
" We proposed to embody the following in said supplemental
contract: . . . All obligations to drill additional wells, except
offset wells, are hereby suspended for a period of two years
from the date of this contract.
"At the expiration of said two year period, Moore shall
be obligated to drill three wells per year in any area consisting
of approximately 400 acres, being that part of the leased
premises which is considered proven territory . . . except
that Moore shall not be obligated to drill during the existence
of either of [certain enumerated conditions]. . . .
"There shall be no obligation to drill any additional wells
on that part of the leased property outside of the proven
area ... unless oil is discovered on said property. . . .
"Except insofar as the provisions of the lease of April 8,
1936, are in conflict herewith, the same shall remain in full
force and effect."
Mr. Tognazzini replied as follows: "In response to yours
of the 11th, may I first advise that the terms and conditions
contained therein are unsatisfactory.
"It was my impression from past conversations you had
with my predecessor, and more recently, with Messrs. Cooke,
Cross, and me that it was the desire of E. H. Moore Inc. to
obtain a modification of the present oil and gas lease existing
between E. H. Moore Inc. and the Union Sugar Company.
In this connection, I expressed to you at our recent meeting
that Union Sugar Company was desirous of cooperating with
E. H. Moore Inc., but only to the extent that both parties
were to benefit mutually by said modification." It is only after
the above-quoted introductory statements, and in the light
of all the preceding negotiations of the parties, that Mr.
Tognazzini went on to summarize what he understood to be
Mr. Martin's "desire" and wnat he understood was the "desire" of the defendant lessor, and after such statement of
what obviously had been largely opposing "desires," he concluded with the following suggestion: "Both you and I, in
obtaining a modification, desire to reduce it to its simples
[sic] form and to this extent I suggest the following, to-wit:
"(1) The suspension of all obligation to drill .!'dditional
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wells, except offset wells, for a period of two years from
of the modification,
"(2) The moiljfying of the paragraph 9, by striking
250 feet and inserting in lieu thereof, 330 feet, and in
tion thereto, appropriate language to provide that when
wells are being produced within said range, more or
E. H. Moore Inc. likewise produce,
"(3) At. the expiration of the two year period, E. H.
Inc. shall be obligated to drill three wells per year.
•, The consideration for the above will be the paying
minimum royalty of $25,000. per year, said royalty _.__..., ...
monthly in advance."
Regardless of who originated the form of language
in the "Supplemental Contract" it was Mr. Martin, act:inirJ
for the plaintiff's predecessor, who finally drafted the
tract; and it was the same Mr. Martin, acting in the
capacity, who was at all times the moving and pressing
in seeking a lease modification. Concerning Mr. Martin,
in the exercise of those fact finding prerogatives which
properly a function of the trial court, rather than of
court, the learned trial judge, in his memorandum
,
says: "As the Court has intimated, it is inconceivable to n~
that E. H. Moore's Inc. able and experienced counsel would'
fail to provide, in plain and unambiguous terms, the present i
contentions of the plaintiff herein, had they been those now;
contended for." Certainly the quoted observation of the
trial judge indicates not misconduct or error, as suggested by'
the majority opinion, but, rather, an entirely proper appre- .
eiation of the significance of circumstantial as well as direct . .
evidence. And, in truth, the letter from Mr. Tognazzini to :
Mr. Martin, which Justice Traynor seizes upon as overwhelm- 1
ing substantially all other evidence in the record, is but
part-a greater part or a lesser part, as various fact finders
might respectively view it-of a record which discloses with
absolute certainty, to a reviewing court, only one thing: a'·
substautial conflict in the evidence.
I have not herein, by any means, related every detail of
~vidence, either direct or circumstantial, which supports the
trial court's findings and construction but what has been set
fortll above is ample, under any pertinent rules of law which
ever Jaeretofore have been followed in this state, not only to
support, but to demand that we sustain, the lower court ill
its findings and conclusion&
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For adequate treatment of those of the points briefed which
I have not found it necessary or desirable to discuss in a dissenting opinion reference is made to the opinion prepared by
Mr. Justice Wilson for the District Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, Division Two, reported in 173 P.2d 700.
The judgment should be affirmed..
Shenk, J., and Carter, J., concurred.
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Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied February
9, 1948. Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a
rehearing.

